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  PERMEABLE	  SOVEREIGNTY	  	  
AND	  RELIGIOUS	  LIBERTY	  
Paul	  Horwitz	  *	  
ABNER	   S.	  GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION:	  THE	  MULTIPLE	   SOURCES	   OF	  AUTHORITY	   IN	   A	  LIBERAL	  DEMOCRACY	  2012.	  Pp.	  333.	  Hardcover,	  $49.95.	  	   INTRODUCTION	  With	  Against	  Obligation,1	  Abner	  Greene2	  has	  accomplished	  a	  valuable	  task:	  he	  has	  written	  a	  book	  that	  is	  both	  timeless	  and	  timely.	  It	  is	  timeless	  insofar	  as	  the	  main	  questions	  asked	  by	  his	  book—whether	  citizens	  have	  a	  general	  moral	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	   law,	   and	   whether	   legal	   interpreters	   “have	   a	   duty	   to	   follow	   prior	   or	   higher	  sources	   of	   constitutional	   meaning”3—are	   perennial,	   and	   perennially	   fresh,	   ques-­‐tions	  in	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  theory.4	  It	  is	  timely	  because	  one	  of	  the	  main	  contri-­‐butions	  of	   the	  book—its	   focus	  on	  what	  Greene	  calls	   “permeable	  sovereignty,”	  and	  particularly	   its	   application	  of	   that	   concept	   to	  questions	  of	   law’s	   treatment	  of	   reli-­‐gious	  obligations—is	  a	  central	  part	  of	  contemporary	  developments	  in	  church-­‐state	  law	  and	  scholarship.5	  
                                                            
 * Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks to Abner Greene for reading 
and commenting on an earlier draft, and to Matthew Bailey for research assistance.  
 1.  ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY (2012) [hereinafter GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION]. 
 2.  Leonard F. Manning Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. 
 3.  See, e.g., GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 1-2.  
 4.  I would be remiss if I did not note another recent and excellent book that focuses on roughly the same 
questions: LAURENCE CLAUS, LAW’S EVOLUTION AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (2012).  
 5.  In church-state law, Greene’s discussion of permeable sovereignty is highly relevant to recent cases 
involving the ministerial exception, see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694 (2012), and the “contraceptive mandate.” See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 
1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. 
Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). In 
church-state scholarship, Greene’s book is relevant to recent discussions of institutional religious freedom 
and/or “freedom of the church.” See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013) [hereinaf-
ter HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS]; Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal 
Incoherence in Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405 (2013); Jed Glickstein, Note, Should the Ministerial 
Exception Apply to Functions, Not Persons?, 122 YALE L.J. 1964 (2013); Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s 
Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1891 (2013); Paul Horwitz, Defending 
(Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 1049 (2013) [hereinafter Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institu-
tionalism]; Paul Horwitz, Rethinking the Law, Not Abandoning It: A Comment on “Overlapping Jurisdictions,” 
4 FAULKNER L. REV. 351 (2013) [hereinafter Horwitz, Rethinking the Law]; John Infranca, Institutional Free 
Exercise and Religious Land Use, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693 (2013); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartz-
man, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013); Symposium, Freedom of the Church in the 
Modern Age, J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming). Those are just a few examples, from the past year 
alone, of the explosion in this area of church-state scholarship. To this very incomplete list I would add, at a 
1
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The	   combination	   of	   timeless	   and	   timely	   topics	   is	   not	   always	   seamlessly	  achieved.6	  Even	  if	  Greene	  himself	  sees	  the	  book	  as	  a	  unity,	  readers	  and	  reviews	  may	  end	  up	  focusing	  more	  on	  one	  aspect	  of	  Greene’s	  book	  than	  on	  others.	  That	  is	  an	  oc-­‐cupational	  hazard	   for	  one	  who	  writes,	  as	  Greene	  has	  done,	  such	  a	  sweeping	  book,	  using	   the	   general	   concept	   of	   obligation	   to	   cover	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   issues,	   from	   the	  fundamental	   jurisprudential	   question	  whether	   there	   is	   a	   general	   duty	   of	   political	  obedience,7	  to	  the	  problems	  with	  history8	  and	  precedent9	  as	  authoritative	  interpre-­‐tive	  sources.	  The	  scope	  of	  his	  achievement	  deserves	  to	  be	  recognized	  and	  praised.	  Nevertheless,	   I	   too	   will	   focus	   on	   just	   a	   sliver	   of	   his	   book:	   chapter	   two	   of	  
Against	   Obligation,	   which	   focuses	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   “permeable	   sover-­‐eignty”	  and	  church-­‐state	  law.10	  Greene	  is	  kind	  enough	  to	  give	  those	  of	  us	  with	  a	  nar-­‐rower	   focus	   an	   out,	  writing	   that	   one	  may	   accept	   his	   account	   of	   permeable	   sover-­‐eignty	   even	   if	   one	   rejects	  his	   foundational	   chapter	   against	   legal	   obligation.11	   I	   am	  not	  so	  sure	  that	  the	  two	  are	  wholly	  separable.12	  But	  the	  challenge	  is	  great	  enough,	  and	  Greene’s	  discussion	  rich	  enough,	  even	  given	  this	  limited	  focus.	  Greene’s	   discussion	   of	   permeable	   sovereignty,	   and	   his	   treatment	   in	   chapter	  two	  of	  its	  application	  to	  religious	  exemptions	  from	  generally	  applicable	  law,	  comes	  at	  a	  useful	  time.	  Religion	  Clause	  litigation,	  in	  a	  very	  real	  if	  crude	  sense,	  and	  law	  and	  religion	  scholarship,	  in	  a	  deep	  if	  vague	  way,	  have	  focused	  with	  increasing	  intensity	  on	   the	   contest	   between	   state	   authority	   and	   other	   authorities,	   especially	   religious	  ones.13	   This	   moment	   represents	   a	   return—perhaps	   a	   recurring	   return14—of	   a	  broader	  debate	  over	  precisely	  how	  pluralist	  and	  how	  authoritative	  our	  legal	  order	  is.	   Do	   the	   state	   and	   its	   laws	   set	   the	   entire	   terms	   of	   engagement,	   accommodating	  other	  obligations	  (if	  at	  all)	  only	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  grace	  or	  forbearance?15	  Or	  are	  there	  other	  authorities	  out	   there,	  other	  obligations	   that	  must	  and	  not	  may	  be	  given	  real	  weight,	  other	  “groups”	  with	  a	  “real	  existence	  that	  the	  state	  recognizes	  but	  does	  not	  
                                                                                                                                                    
minimum, older and newer pieces by scholars such as Richard Garnett, Steven D. Smith, Zoe Robinson, James 
Nelson, Jessie Hill, Caroline Mala Corbin, Kathleen Brady, Michael McConnell, Douglas Laycock, Leslie 
Griffin, and others. 
 6.  See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Political and Constitutional Obligation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1258 
(2013) (“Greene is not as clear as he might be about the relationship between these two claims.”). 	   7.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  ch.	  1.	  	   8.	  	   Id.	  at	  ch.	  3.	  	   9.	  	   Id.	  at	  ch.	  4.	  
 10.  For a review with a similar focus, albeit from a very different perspective, see Linda C. McClain, 
Against Agnosticism: Why the Liberal State Isn’t Just One (Authority) Among Many, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1319 
(2013). It may help underscore the difference in our perspectives that my recent book on law and religion fo-
cuses on agnosticism, see THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2011) [hereinafter 
HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE], and that one working title for the book was Constitutional Agnosticism. For 
another, no doubt better, recent book emphasizing agnosticism in its own way, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, 
DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013).  	   11.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  33-­‐34.	  
 12.  See generally Micah Schwartzman, Obligation, Anarchy, and Exemption, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 93 
(2013) (reviewing GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1).  
 13.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, supra note 5, at 1049-50. 
 15.  See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 
1159, 1160 (2013) (describing a “state-conferred-dispensation view,” which asserts “the priority and suprema-
cy of the state” and grants religious freedom as a matter of “beneficence,” and charging that it “is the dominant 
view today.”).  
2
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create?”16	   If	   so,	  how	  do	  we	  set	   the	   just	   terms	  of	  engagement	  and	  co-­‐existence	  be-­‐tween	  them—and	  just	  who	  is	  the	  “we”	  that	  will	  do	  so?	  The	  reasons	  for	  the	  return	  and	  heightened	  intensity	  of	  this	  debate	  are	  varied	  and	  interesting.	  As	  its	  recurring	  nature	  suggests,	  some	  of	  the	  debate	  has	  to	  do	  with	  a	  broader	  and	  perhaps	  endless	  movement	  back	  and	  forth	  of	  the	  pendulum.	  On	  this	  view,	  first	  public	  and	  then	  private	  ordering	  dominate	  the	  conversation;	  as	  each	  side	  dominates	   in	   turn,	   it	  gives	  birth	   to	  renewed	  resistance	  and	  a	  revival	  of	   interest	   in	  the	  opposing	  position.	  Some	  of	  it	  may	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  polariza-­‐tion	  and	  culture	  wars,17	  in	  which	  each	  side	  seeks	  mastery	  of	  the	  levers	  of	  power	  and	  worries	   that	   the	  other	   side	   is	  gaining	  an	  undue	  advantage.18	  And	  some	  of	   it	  has	  a	  
faute	   de	  mieux	  quality.	  Employment	   Division	   v.	   Smith19	   is	   still	   the	   law	   of	   the	   land.	  Many	   strong	   supporters	   of	   Free	   Exercise	   rights	   (although	   not	   Greene	   himself)20	  have	  become	   increasingly	   reconciled	   to	   it.21	  Despite	   the	  existence	  of	   statutory	  ex-­‐ceptions	  to	  that	  regime,22	  and	  the	  potential	  ease	  with	  which	  judges	  can	  get	  around	  it,23	  Smith	  continues	  to	  cast	  a	  long	  shadow	  over	  free	  exercise	  law	  and	  theory,	  forcing	  those	  who	  champion	  broad	  religious	  liberty	  rights	  to	  find	  other	  avenues	  of	  circum-­‐scribing	  state	  authority	  over	  religion.	  These	  and	  other	  factors	  have	  combined	  to	  put	  the	  enduring	  contest	  between	  state	  and	  religious	  authority	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  judicial	  and	  scholarly	  agenda	  in	  this	  area.	  Greene’s	  discussion	  of	  permeable	  sovereignty,	  and	  his	  attempt	  to	  cash	  out	  that	  
                                                            
 16.  Jacob T. Levy, From Liberal Constitutionalism to Pluralism, in MODERN PLURALISM: ANGLO-
AMERICAN DEBATES SINCE 1880, at 33 (Mark Bevir ed., 2012). See also Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword: 
Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1953): 
The heart of the pluralistic thesis is the conviction that government must recognize that it 
is not the sole possessor of sovereignty, and that private groups within the community are 
entitled to lead their own free lives and exercise within the area of their competence an 
authority so effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign authority. 
 17.  See, e.g., HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 10, at 136-42; Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, 
and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407 (2011). 
 18.  Thus, one side sees the state as having expanded its regulatory reach so much that there is little room 
left for a rich sphere of private conduct, conscience, and obligation. Exemptions or resistance thus become ever 
more necessary. See, e,g., Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721-22 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ronald 
J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 24 (2013); Richard W. Garnett, Pluralism, Dia-
logue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes and the Church-State Nexus, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 503, 521 
(2006-2007); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23-24 (1985). The 
other side worries that claims for legislative or judicial exemptions from law have become an ever more power-
ful and dangerous vehicle which “elevates religious entities to a far higher ground than everyone else.” Marsha 
B. Freeman, What’s Religion Got to Do With It? Virtually Nothing: Hosanna-Tabor and the Unbridled Power 
of the Ministerial Exemption, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 133, 147 (2013); see also Dahlia Lithwick, Con-
science Creep: What’s So Wrong with Conscience Clauses?, SLATE (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/10/is_there_a_principled_way_to_respon
d_to_the_proliferation_of_conscience.html (describing conscience clauses in legislation as a potential “vehicle 
by which we are going to end-run the most fundamental aspects of the social welfare state.”).  
 19.  Emp’t	  Div.,	  Dept.	  of	  Human	  Res.	  of	  Or.	  v.	  Smith,	  494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral, generally 
applicable laws give rise to no serious claim to a judicial mandated exemption under the Free Exercise Clause).  
 20.  GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  116.	  Nor	  me.	  See	  HORWITZ,	  THE	  AGNOSTIC	  AGE,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  184-­‐90.	  	  
 21.  See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1815 (2011).  
 22.  See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42	  U.S.C.	   §§	   2000bb	   to	   2000bb-­‐4	   (1993); Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42	  U.S.C.	  §2000cc-­‐1 (2000).  
 23.  See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Smith in Theory and Practice, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2055, 2056 (2011) 
(“[M]any judges find they have all the room they need to carve out needed exemptions for religious practition-
ers despite the principal rule of Smith.”). 
3
Horwitz: Permeable Sovereignty and Religious Liberty
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
238	   TULSA	  LAW	  REVIEW	   [Vol.	  49:235	  
concept	   in	   church-­‐state	   law,	   is	   a	   valuable	   contribution	   to	   this	   discussion.	   As	   it	  stands,	  that	  discussion	  suffers	  from	  one	  major	  shortcoming,	  one	  that	  is	  admittedly	  chronic	   in	  much	   constitutional	   scholarship.	   Some	  of	   the	   scholarship	   is	   beautifully	  theorized;	  but	  the	  theory	  is	  not	  always	  brought	  to	  the	  level	  of	  doctrine.	  Some	  of	  it	  is	  doctrinally	  sophisticated,	  but	  sufficiently	   lacking	   in	  theory	  that	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  de-­‐termine	  what	  all	  the	  doctrine-­‐chopping	  is	  for,	  let	  alone	  to	  identify	  a	  metric	  by	  which	  it	  can	  be	  evaluated.	  It	  is	  to	  Greene’s	  great	  credit	  that	  he	  makes	  a	  serious	  effort	  to	  do	  both	  things,	  and	  does	  them	  well.	  Theorists	  and	  doctrinalists	  alike	  will	  have	  to	  reck-­‐on	  with	  this	  book.	  That	  said,	  one	  may	  wonder	  if	  Greene	  succeeds	  fully	  at	  either	  task—or,	  just	  as	  important,	   at	   linking	   the	   two	   enterprises.	   A	   popular	  metaphor	   in	   Religion	   Clause	  jurisprudence	  is	  that	  of	  the	  “play	  in	  the	  joints.”24	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  Religion	  Clauses.	  But	  the	  metaphor,	  slightly	  adapted,	  applies	  as	  well	  to	  the	  con-­‐nection	  between	  the	  theory	  of	  religious	  freedom	  and	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  Reli-­‐gion	  Clauses.	  A	  good	  deal	  of	  stress	  is	  borne	  by	  the	  linkage	  or	  joint	  between	  the	  two,	  and	  more	  often	  than	  not	  this	  is	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  point.25	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Greene’s	  admirable	  book,	  the	  weakness	  strikes	  me	  as	  afflicting	  two	  “joints”	  or	  linkages:	  1)	  the	  linkage	  between	  his	  general	  discussion	  of	  permeable	  sovereignty	  and	  his	  broad	  argument	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  shape	  of	  religious	   liberty;	  and	   2)	   the	   linkage	   between	   his	   approach	   to	   religious	   liberty	   and	   specific	   cases.	   I	  worry	   in	  both	  cases	   that	  Greene	  has	  offered	  a	   fairly	  attractive	   theory,	  and	  a	   fairly	  attractive	  (if	  problematic)	  jurisprudential	  approach,	  but	  has	  not	  adequately	  tied	  the	  two	  together.	  Other	  writers	  have	  taken	  on	  the	  religious	  liberty	  aspects	  of	  Greene’s	  work	  at	  the	  broader	  level	  of	  theory,26	  and	  at	  least	  one	  writer	  has	  quarreled	  with	  the	  kinds	  of	  outcomes	  that	  his	  approach	  to	  religious	  liberty	  entails.27	  If	  I	  have	  something	  to	  add	  here,	  it	  is	  that	  I	  come	  as	  a	  friend.	  I	  am	  broadly	  sympathetic	  to	  his	  account	  of	  perme-­‐able	  sovereignty,	  and	  his	  argument	   that	   it	  has	   important	   implications	   for	  Religion	  Clause	   jurisprudence.28	   Although	   I	   quarrel	   with	   some	   of	   his	   jurisprudential	   ap-­‐proach—particularly	  his	  insistence	  that	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  “invalidat[es]	  leg-­‐islation	  based	   in	  express,	  predominant	  religious	   justification”29—I	  have	  every	  rea-­‐
                                                            
 24.  It originates in Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). For more recent 
usages, see, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718-19 (2004). 
 25.  I do not exempt myself. Whatever virtues The Agnostic Age may have, I agree with those critics who 
have said that it is most vulnerable to uncertainty or attack at the point of implementation of its general theory 
or approach in specific cases. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, We Hold Which Truths?, COMMONWEAL 29, Sept. 
23, 2011. That this problem is widespread and may be inevitable in church-state law and theory is cold com-
fort. See, e.g., HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 10, at ch. 8; MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY 
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2013) (describing the law and theory of religious freedom as suffering from the prob-
lem of tragic choices). And, although they are justly subject to criticism, there are examples of writers in this 
field who have done a careful and detailed job of both articulating a theory and applying it to a body of cases. 
Two commendable examples are CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007), and KOPPELMAN, supra note 10.  
 26.  See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 12; Seidman, supra note 6.  
 27.  See McClain, supra note 10 (worrying, in particular, about how Greene’s argument for a broad freedom 
for nomic communities will affect children). Seidman, supra note 6, also questions some details of Greene’s 
religious liberty approach.  
 28.  See, e.g., HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 5; Horwitz, Defending (Religious) 
Institutionalism, supra note 5; Horwitz, Rethinking the Law, supra note 5.  	   29.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  155.	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son	   to	  want	   his	   project	   to	   succeed.	   In	   this	   case,	   it	  may	   be	   that	   friendship	   entails	  stabbing	  Greene	  in	  the	  front	  and	  not	  the	  back,	  so	  to	  speak.	  	  I	   have	   few	   answers.	   I	  will	   not	   present	   a	   competing	   theory	   or	   implementing	  approach	  here;	   indeed,	  as	   I	   said,	   in	  many	  respects	   I	   sympathize	  with	  Greene’s	  ap-­‐proach.	  Nevertheless,	   I	  have	  a	   lot	  of	  questions.	   Some	  are	  broad;	   some	  are	  narrow	  and	  may	  come	  close	   to	  nit-­‐picking.	  But	  nit-­‐picking	  may	  be	  a	  genuine	  contribution	  here,	  if	  I	  am	  right	  about	  the	  gap	  between	  high-­‐level	  theory	  and	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  doc-­‐trinal	   practice	   that	   afflicts	  most	  unified	   theories	   of	  Religion	  Clause	   jurisprudence,	  including	   Greene’s.	   After	   laying	   the	   ground	   by	   summarizing	   Greene’s	   key	   argu-­‐ments,	  I	  offer	  a	  volley	  of	  questions,	  which	  involve	  both	  his	  theory	  of	  permeable	  sov-­‐ereignty	  and	  his	  specific	  approach	  to	  Religion	  Clause	  cases,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  joints	  be-­‐tween	  the	  two.	  I	  close	  with	  a	  broader	  question.	  I	  wonder	  whether	  Greene	  does	  not	  err	  in	  de-­‐scribing	  his	  doctrinal	  application	  of	  the	  permeable	  sovereignty	  approach	  as	  a	  mat-­‐ter	   of	   “releasing	  people	   from	   the	   grip	   of	   the	   law.”30	   Putting	   things	   in	   those	   terms	  may	  cede	  too	  much	  ground	  to	  those	  who	  see	  state	  sovereignty	  as	  plenary,	  and	  give	  them	  the	  rhetorical	  high	  ground	  from	  which	  to	  insist	  that	  exemptions	  are	  a	  way	  of	  putting	  religious	  claimants	  “above”	  or	  “outside”	  the	  law.31	  Whether	  from	  within	  the	  permeable	  sovereignty	  perspective	  or	  otherwise,	  we	  might	  better	  view	  these	  con-­‐flicts	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  renegotiating	  the	  law	  to	  include	  some	  recognition	  of	  permeable	  sovereignty	  and	  religious	  commitments,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  demand	  by	  religious	  and	  other	  nomic	  groups	  to	  stand	  outside	  the	  law	  altogether.32	  I.	   GREENE’S	  PERMEABLE	  SOVEREIGNTY	  APPROACH	  TO	  RELIGIOUS	  LIBERTY	  
A.	   Permeable	  Sovereignty	  The	  modern	  liberal	  state,	  Greene	  writes,	  claims	  a	  status	  of	  plenary	  sovereign-­‐ty.	   “It	   claims	   the	   legitimate	   power	   to	   demand	   general	   legal	   compliance.	   It	   might	  recognize	  exceptions	  for	  various	  reasons,	  but	  it	  is	  within	  the	  state’s	  discretion	  to	  so	  recognize.”33	  This	  view	  is	  summed	  up	  dramatically	  in	  a	  statement	  by	  Emile	  Combes,	  a	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	  French	  prime	  minister:	  “There	  are,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  rights	  ex-­‐cept	  the	  right	  of	  the	  State,	  and	  there	  [is],	  and	  there	  can	  be	  no	  other	  authority	  than	  the	  authority	  of	   the	  Republic.”34	   It	   is	  rarely	  so	  bluntly	  stated,	  but	   the	  view	  that	  all	  
                                                            	   30.	  	   Id.	  at	  149.	  In	  correspondence	  with	  me,	  Professor	  Greene	  has	  suggested	  that	  I	  may	  elide	  two	  points	  here.	   In	  his	  description,	  any	  accommodations	  of	  religious	  obligations	  would	   themselves	  be	  “within	   the	  law,”	  while	  the	  religious	  norms	  themselves	  would	  fall	  outside	  “the	  norms	  of	  the	  state’s	  law.”	  Email	  from	  Abner	  Greene	  to	  Paul	  Horwitz,	  Oct.	  18,	  2013	  (on	  file	  with	  author).	  I	  think	  the	  clarification	  is	  a	  useful	  one	  and	  thank	  him	  for	  providing	  it,	  although	  I	  think	  my	  broader	  point	  here	  expressing	  concern	  about	  being	  too	  quick	  to	  cede	  the	  language	  of	  “the	  law”	  to	  one	  side	  of	  the	  argument	  still	  has	  some	  value.	  
 31.  See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law?: The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption 
From Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007); Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-
Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 984 (2013) (“[T]he numerous justifications for the [ministerial] exception are all a 
restatement of one foundational and fundamentally mistaken argument: that religious groups are entitled to 
disobey the law.”); Horwitz, Rethinking the Law, supra note 5, at 353 (quoting a draft paper by John Witte de-
scribing advocates of Shari’a law as “hav[ing] given up on the state and its capacity to reform its laws of sexu-
ality, marriage, and family life” and “want[ing] to become a law unto themselves.”).  
 32.  See generally Horwitz, Rethinking the Law, supra note 5.  	   33.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  20.	  
 34.  J.N. Figgis, The Great Leviathan, in THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE: SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
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power	  lies	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state,	  and	  that	  any	  constraints	  on	  that	  power—whether	  constitutionally	  mandated	  or	  provided	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  political	  grace—depend	  wholly	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  state	  power	  is	  common	  enough.	  In	  Greene’s	  view,	  “viewing	  state	  sovereignty	  as	  plenary	  is	  a	  wish,	  a	  hope,	  an	  il-­‐lusion,	   and	  we	   should	  dispense	  with	   it.”35	   Instead,	  we	   should	   view	  our	   social	   and	  legal	  order	  as	  one	  of	  “permeable	  sovereignty.”	  “Many	  of	  us	  adhere	  to	  norms	  other	  than	  the	  state’s	  laws.”36	  Those	  sources	  of	  norms	  include	  “religion,	  philosophy,	  fami-­‐ly,	  ethnic	  and	  cultural	  groups,	  and	  more,”	  although	  Greene’s	  primary	  focus	  is	  on	  re-­‐ligion.37	  We	  should	  not	  view	  those	  norms	  as	  subordinate	  to	  the	  state’s	  own	  vision,	  or	  their	  authority	  as	  subordinate	  to	  that	  of	  the	  state.	  Rather,	  “we	  should	  see	  sover-­‐eignty	  as	  permeable	  through	  to	  our	  plural	  sources	  of	  obligation,	  rather	  than	  as	  ab-­‐solute	  in	  the	  state	  and	  its	  laws.”38	  	  Greene’s	  account	  of	  permeable	  sovereignty	  is	  both	  descriptive	  and	  normative.	  Descriptively,	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  “complex	  set	  of	  sources	  of	  normative	  authori-­‐ty	  to	  which	  many	  people	  turn”	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  actual	  practice.39	  It	  also	  comports	  on	  a	  local	   level	  with	   the	  American	   constitutional	   structure,	   at	   the	  heart	  of	  which	   lies	   a	  “core	   commitment	   to	   multiple	   repositories	   of	   power.”40	   On	   this	   view,	   the	   state	  should	  be	  understood	  as	   just	  one	  of	  many	  potential	  sources	  of	  authority,	  and	  “the	  state’s	   law	   [should]	   be	   understood	   as	   just	   one	   source	   of	   the	   norms	   that	   properly	  govern	   people’s	   lives.”41	   We	   should	   thus	   “see	   the	   state’s	   sovereignty	   as	   permea-­‐ble—full	  of	  holes,	  rather	  than	  full.”42	  Normatively,	   Greene	   argues	   that	   permeable	   sovereignty	   offers	   an	   attractive	  understanding	  of	  our	  political	  structure.	  It	  draws	  on	  a	  substantial	  literature	  of	  plu-­‐ralism	   and	  multiculturalism.43	   It	   advances	   a	   suitably	   humble,	   anti-­‐foundationalist	  “agnosticism	  of	  value	  that	  helps	  explain	  much	  of	  our	  constitutional	  order.”44	  And	  by	  recognizing	  the	  multiple	  sources	  of	  authority	  that	  compete	  for	  our	  attention	  and	  al-­‐legiance,	  and	  the	  interpretive	  and	  political	  responsibilities	  that	  reside	  in	  each	  indi-­‐vidual	  citizen,	  rather	  than	  in	  any	  single	  sovereign	  entity,	  “we	  increase	  our	  chances	  of	  being	  active,	  rather	  than	  passive,	  citizens.”45	  We	  prevent	  the	  alienation	  of	  power	  “from	  its	  true	  source—the	  people,	  as	  citizens.46	  Taking	  permeable	  sovereignty	  as	  “a	  baseline,”47	  as	  a	  reminder	  “that	  authority	  
                                                                                                                                                    
G.D.H. COLE, J.N. FIGGIS, AND H.J. LASKI 112 (Paul Q. Hirst ed., 1989) (quoting French Prime Minister, Emi-
le Combes). See also Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom, Church Autonomy, and Constitutionalism, 57 
DRAKE L. REV. 901, 902 (2009); Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, supra note 5, at 1049.  	   35.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  115.	  	   36.	  	   Id.	  at	  2.	  	   37.	  	   Id.	  at	  20.	  	   38.	  	   Id.	  at	  2-­‐3.	  	   39.	  	   Id.	  at	  20.	  	   40.	  	   Id.	  at	  4.	  	   41.	  	   Id.	  	  	   42.	  	   Id.	  at	  20.	  	   43.	  	   Id.	  at	  21-­‐22.	  	   44.	  	   Id.	  at	  23.	  	   45.	  	   Id.	  at	  3.	  	   46.	  	   Id.	  	  	   47.	  	   Id.	  at	  20.	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ultimately	   rests	   elsewhere	   than	   in	   the	   state,”48	   has	  many	   implications	   for	  Greene,	  most	  of	  which	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	   this	  review.	   It	  helps	  ground	  his	  central	  ar-­‐gument,	   in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  his	  book,	  that	  “there	  is	  no	  successful	  general	  case	  for	  a	  presumptive	  .	  .	  .	  moral	  duty	   to	  obey	   the	   law,”	   although	   such	  an	  obligation	  may	  at-­‐tach	  in	  particular	  cases.49	  It	  supports	  his	  argument	  against	  an	  “interpretive	  obliga-­‐tion	  to	  prior	  sources	  of	  constitutional	  meaning,”	  such	  as	  “original	  understanding	  or	  meaning	  or	  the	  teachings	  of	  precedent,”	   insofar	  as	   interpretive	  authority,	   like	  sov-­‐ereignty,	   is	   “permeable	  rather	   than	  plenary,	  permeable	   through	   to	  different	   inter-­‐preters	  (other	  than	  the	  [Supreme]	  Court)	  and	  sources	  of	  interpretation	  (other	  than	  the	  past).”50	  It	  also	  directs,	  or	  purports	  to	  direct,	  his	  account	  of	  religious	  liberty,	  to	  which	  I	  now	  turn.	  
B.	   Religious	  Liberty	  Speaking	  very	  roughly,	  the	  modern	  American	  legal	  regime	  of	  religious	  liberty	  can	   be	   viewed	   as	   falling	   into	   two	  major	   periods.	   The	   first	   period	   began	   in	   1963,	  when	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  issued	  its	  decision	  in	  Sherbert	  v.	  Verner.51	  During	  that	  pe-­‐riod,	  the	  legal	  rule	  was	  that	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause	  requires	  a	  presumptive	  right	  to	  an	  exemption	  or	  accommodation	   from	  laws	  that	  burden	  religious	   liberty,	  whether	  those	  laws	  are	  aimed	  at	  religion	  or	  not.52	  The	   second	   period	   commenced	   in	   1990	   with	   the	   issuance	   of	   the	   Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Smith.53	   In	  Smith,	   the	  Court	  held	  that	  “the	  right	  of	   free	  exercise	  does	  not	  relieve	  an	  individual	  of	  the	  obligation	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  valid	  and	  neutral	  law	  of	  general	  applicability.”54	  In	  other	  words,	  mere	  incidental	  burdens	  on	  religion	  do	  not	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  presumptive,	   judicially	  granted	  exemption	  from	  general	   laws.	  In	   practice,	   both	   because	   of	   legislation55	   and	   case	   law,56	   Smith’s	   impact	   is	   not	   as	  broad	  as	   its	  early	  critics	   feared	   it	  would	  be.	   In	   theory,	  however,	   the	   two	   tests	  are	  strikingly	  different	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  starting	  points	  and	  default	  rules,	  even	  if	  the	  two	  regimes	  were	  not	  always	  radically	  different	  in	  application.	  Put	  simply,	  Greene	  would	  enlist	  permeable	  sovereignty	  to	  take	  us	  back	  to	  the	  first	   period,	   the	  Sherbert	  era—or	  what	   he	   believes	   that	   period	   should	   have	   been.	  Government,	   he	  writes,	   “should	   seek	   to	   assist	   those	  who	   find	   themselves	   in	   a	   di-­‐lemma	  of	  competing	  claims	  of	  sovereignty,	   from	  state	  and	  other	  sources.”57	  Those	  living	  under	  competing	  claims	  in	  a	  system	  of	  permeable	  sovereignty	  ought	  to	  have	  
                                                            	   48.	  	   Id.	  at	  24.	  	   49.	  	   Id.	  at	  2;	  see	  generally	  id.	  at	  35-­‐113.	  	   50.	  	   Id.	  at	  162-­‐63;	  see	  generally	  id.	  at	  161-­‐251.	  
 51.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 52.  The rule was, however, applied very weakly. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a 
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 127-28 (1992).  
 53.  Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 54.  Id. at 879 (quotations and citation omitted).  
 55.  See e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 
supra note 22. Many states have similar legislation. 
 56.  See, e.g., Tebbe, supra note 23; Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: 
Smith, Lukumi, and the General Applicability Requirement, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (2001).  	   57.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  114.	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some	  partial	   “exit	  options”	   to	  help	   them	  avoid	  “the	  clutches	  of	   the	  state.”58	   Judges	  and	   legislators	   should	   therefore	  provide	   “exemptions	   for	   the	   free	   exercise	  of	   reli-­‐gion	  .	  .	  .	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  constitutional	  right.”59	  	  Such	   a	   right,	   he	   makes	   clear,	   “is	   prima	   facie	   only,	   subject	   to	   override	   by	   a	  compelling	  state	  interest.”60	  That	  is	  what	  Sherbert	  required.	  But	  Greene	  would	  make	  the	  application	  of	  that	  test	  more	  demanding.	  Given	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  state’s	  claim	  to	  legitimacy	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  other	  claims	  of	  authority,	  when	  addressing	  such	  claims,	   “[g]overnment	  has	   to	   earn	   its	   stripes,	   law	  by	   law	  or	   case	  by	   case.”61	  He	   is	  highly	  skeptical	  of	  governmental	  claims	  that	  uniformity	  is	  a	  compelling	  state	  inter-­‐est,	  and	  argues	  that	  we	  should	  hesitate	  before	  accepting	  “paternalistic	  justifications	  for	  the	  application	  of	  law	  to	  religious	  and	  other	  deeply	  held,	  normative	  views.”62	  This	   is	   a	   strong	   rule,	   and	   Greene	   cabins	   it	   in	   other	  ways.	   In	   particular,	   and	  against	  the	  current	  of	  the	  cases,	  he	  argues	  that	  courts	  could	  inquire	  into	  whether	  a	  claim	  for	  an	  exemption	  involves	  “a	  central	  religious	  or	  other	  practice.”63	  He	  makes	  clear,	  as	  I	  noted,	  that	  the	  right	  is	  still	  only	  prima	  facie,	  and	  allows	  for	  “case-­‐by-­‐case	  judicial	  balancing.”64	  And	  he	  recognizes	  the	  difficult	  choices	  involved	  in	  dealing	  with	  arguments	  for	  exemptions	  by	  illiberal	  groups,	  which	  may	  present	  strong	  competing	  equality	  claims.65	  But	  this	  is	  still	  a	  very	  strong	  default	  rule	  in	  favor	  of	  religious	  ex-­‐emptions66—rightly	  so,	  in	  Greene’s	  view,	  given	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  state’s	  claim	  of	  plenary	  sovereignty	  and	  of	  a	  concomitant	  general	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law.	  This	  approach	  is	  both	  strengthened	  and	  necessitated,	  according	  to	  Greene,	  by	  a	  special	  feature	  of	  the	  Religion	  Clauses:	  the	  balance	  they	  strike	  between	  disabling	  and	   protecting	   religion	   in	   the	   political	   process.67	   The	   Religion	   Clauses,	   he	  writes,	  “should	  be	  understood	  as	  striking	  a	  political	  balance,	  offsetting	  a	  gag	  rule	  with	  ex-­‐
                                                            	   58.	  	   Id.	  at	  115-­‐16.	  	   59.	  	   Id.	  at	  116.	  	   60.	  	   Id.	  at	  123.	  	   61.	  	   Id.	  at	  124.	  
 62.  Id.	  at	  118.	  For present purposes, I deal only with “religious” exemptions, leaving aside questions of 
whether other strongly held beliefs or sources of authority should be entitled to equal treatment. Much of 
Greene’s argument is limited to religion, although he acknowledges the broader question and sketches some 
arguments in favor of extending exemption rights across all manner of claims. Id. at 116. Jay Wexler addresses 
this point more directly elsewhere. Jay Wexler, Some Thoughts on the First Amendment’s Religion Clause and 
Abner Greene’s Against Obligation, with Reference to Patton Oswalt’s Character “Paul From Staten Island” 
in the Film Big Fan, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1363 (2013). This has been an important question in law and religion 
scholarship of late. See, especially, Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1351 (2012).  
 63.  GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  130;	  see, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (rejecting a centrality test); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 
485 U.S. 439, 457-58 (1988) (pre-Smith case rejecting centrality inquiry); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: 
The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 958-59 (1989) (enumerat-
ing problems with centrality).  	   64.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  131,	  156.	  	   65.	  	   Id.	  at	  157-­‐60.	  
 66.  With respect to illiberal groups in particular, although he recognizes that some of their exemption 
claims should fail, his approach is “deferential to (even illiberal) persons/groups desiring to depart from law 
and live by their own lights.” Id. at 157. I generally share Greene’s perspective here. For criticisms of this ap-
proach for failing to give appropriate weight to equality concerns and neglecting to give full consideration to 
the case of children, see McClain, supra note 10.  
 67.  See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993). In 
Against Obligation, Greene argues that the political balance argument for exemptions “fits with my theme but 
could be considered a stand-alone argument.” GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 149. 
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emptions.”68	  The	  Establishment	  Clause’s	  “gag	  rule”	  requires	  the	  invalidation	  of	  any	  law	  that	  is	  “based	  in	  express,	  predominant	  religious	  justification.”69	  Put	  more	  positively,	  “For	  a	   law	   to	  be	  upheld	  against	   an	  Establishment	  Clause	   challenge,	   the	   law’s	  predomi-­‐nant	  express	  purpose	  must	  be	  secular,	  and	  any	  expressly	  religious	  purpose	  for	  the	  law	  must	  be	  ancillary	  and	  not	  itself	  predominant.”70	  Legislators	  and	  voters	  are	  enti-­‐tled	  to	  rely	  on	  their	  religious	  beliefs	  “when	  they	  form	  political	  positions	  or	  decide	  how	  to	  vote.”71	  But	  an	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  law	  that	  is	  stated	  in	  predominantly	  re-­‐ligious	  terms	  “effectively	  excludes	  those	  who	  don’t	  share	  the	  relevant	  religious	  faith	  from	  meaningful	  participation	  in	  the	  political	  process.”72	  “Reference	  to	  human	  expe-­‐rience	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  common	  denominator	  for	  political	  debate.”73	  Conversely,	  “[w]hen	  religious	  believers	  enact	  laws	  for	  the	  express	  purpose	  of	  advancing	  norms	  dictated	  by	  their	  religion,	  they	  exclude	  nonbelievers	  from	  meaningful	  participation	  in	   political	   discourse	   and	   from	  meaningful	   access	   to	   the	   source	   of	   normative	   au-­‐thority	  predicating	  law.”74	  Free	  Exercise	  exemptions	  are	  a	  corollary	  to	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  gag	  rule.	  “[D]enial	  of	  a	  right	  of	  political	  participation	  is	  sufficient	  to	  undermine	  political	  obli-­‐gation	   and	   to	   strip	   the	   state	   of	   its	   claim	  of	   legitimacy.”75	   Exemptions	   are	   thus	   re-­‐quired,	  “to	  compensate	  religious	  people	  for	  the	  obstacle	  [the	  gag	  rule]	  poses	  to	  their	  participation	   in	   the	  democratic	   process.”76	  Religious	   faith	   is	   simultaneously	   a	   for-­‐bidden	  ground	  for	  lawmaking	  and	  “a	  ground	  for	  avoiding	  the	  obligations	  of	  law.”77	  II.	   QUESTIONS	  POSED	  BY	  GREENE’S	  APPROACH	  Despite,	  or	  perhaps	  because	  of,	  my	  general	  sympathy	  for	  Greene’s	  permeable	  sovereignty	   approach	   to	   religious	   liberty,	   I	   am	   left	   with	   a	   number	   of	   questions	  about	  both	  its	  justification	  and	  its	  implementation.	  	  
A.	   Questions	  of	  Connection	  Between	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  I	   find	  much	   to	   appreciate	   in	   the	   broad	   picture	   Greene	   draws	   of	   permeable	  sovereignty.	  Anyone	  who	  has	  written	  with	  admiration	  of	  both	  pluralism	  and	  agnos-­‐ticism,78	   and	   advocated	   an	   understanding	   of	   our	   social	   and	   legal	   order	   in	   which	  non-­‐state	  institutions	  play	  a	  key	  role,79	  is	  bound	  to	  find	  something	  attractive	  about	  a	  theory	  that	  “is	  based	  in	  keeping	  front	  and	  center	  agnosticism	  of	  value	  and	  its	  man-­‐
                                                            	   68.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  150.	  	   69.	  	   Id.	  at	  155.	  	   70.	  	   Id.	  at	  152.	  	   71.	  	   Id.	  at	  151.	  	   72.	  	   Id.	  at	  150.	  	   73.	  	   Id.	  	  	   74.	  	   Id.	  at	  151.	  	   75.	  	   Id.	  at	  155.	  	   76.	  	   Id.	  	  	   77.	  	   Id.	  	  
 78.  See, e.g., HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 10; Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutional-
ism, supra note 5; Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Spheres and Sovereignty, 44 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009).  
 79.  See generally HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. 
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ifestation	   in	   the	   political	   setting,	   permeable	   sovereignty”;	   that	   rejects	   a	   vision	   of	  state	  power	  as	  plenary	  and	  conceives	  of	   the	  Constitution	  as	   “anti-­‐foundationalist”	  and	  focused	  on	  “multiple	  repositories	  of	  power;”	  that	  gives	  pride	  of	  place	  to	  “doubt”	  and	  “the	  centrifugal”;	  and	  that	  “start[s]	  from	  the	  outside	  in,	  rather	  than	  from	  the	  in-­‐side	  out,	   and	  begin[s]	  with	   a	  presumption	   that	   various	   comprehensive	   views,	   not	  just	  our	  own,	  might	  be	  correct.”80	  This	  approach	  is	  not	  entirely	  reassuring	  for	  a	  law-­‐yer.	  It	  may	  drive	  the	  rule-­‐bound	  to	  distraction.	  There	  is	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  virtue	  in	  set-­‐tlement.	  But	  there	  is	  also	  reason	  to	  reject	  “the	  lure	  of	  rule-­‐ness,”81	  and	  to	  appreciate	  a	  constitutional	  vision	  that	  cabins	  power	  by	  diffusing	  it	  rather	  than	  attempting,	  with	  uncertain	  success	  at	  best,	  to	  enthrone	  the	  state	  (let	  alone	  the	  court)	  and	  expect	  it	  to	  lay	  down	  clear	  rules	  for	  its	  exercise	  of	  power.	  That	  said,	   it	   is	  sometimes	  unclear	  how	  Greene’s	  broader	  vision	  of	  permeable	  sovereignty	  relates	  to	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  implementation.	  Greene	  assures	  us	  that	  “one	  could	   adopt	   [his]	   argument	   for	  permeable	   sovereignty”	   even	   if	   one	   rejects	  his	   ar-­‐gument	   that	   “the	   state’s	   political	   legitimacy”	   is	   correlative	  with	   “a	   citizen’s	  moral	  duty	   to	  obey	   the	   law.”82	  His	  discussion	  of	   religious	   liberty	  acknowledges	   that	  per-­‐meable	  sovereignty	  might,	  as	  his	  language	  in	  the	  book	  generally	  suggests,	  require	  “a	  constitutional	   right	   to	   judicial	   exemptions	   for	   nonreligious	   norms,”	   with	   all	   the	  questions	  that	  entails,83	  but	  sets	  that	  issue	  to	  one	  side.84	  He	  argues	  that	  his	  account	  of	  the	  symbiotic	  nature	  of	  the	  Religion	  Clauses,	  with	  Establishment	  Clause	  gag	  rules	  balanced	  by	  Free	  Exercise	  exemptions,	  is	  consistent	  with	  his	  larger	  vision	  of	  perme-­‐able	  sovereignty,	  but	  “could	  be	  considered	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  argument:	  one	  could	  reject	  it	   and	   accept	   the	   foregoing	   case	   for	   state	   recognition	   of	   permeable	   sovereignty;	  conversely,	  one	  could	  accept	  it	  while	  rejecting	  all	  or	  pieces	  of	  the	  foregoing.”85	  Greene	  presents	  all	  this	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  Against	  Obligation,	  which	  allows	  us	  to	  accept	  or	  reject	  particular	  pieces	  of	  his	  argument	  without	  worrying	  about	  the	  rest.	  Readers	  might	  view	  it	  as	  a	  bug.	  In	  the	  piece	  of	  the	  book	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  here,	  dealing	   with	   religious	   liberty,	   it	   becomes	   difficult	   to	   tell	   what	   independent	   work	  permeable	  sovereignty	  does	   in	   requiring	  or	  guiding	  his	  prescriptions	   for	   the	  Reli-­‐gion	  Clauses.	  That	  matters,	  I	  think,	  because	  it	  affects	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  arguments	  in	  favor	  of	  (or	  against)	  adopting	  the	  balancing	  approach	  Greene	  recommends.	   If	   that	  approach	  is	  not	  required	  by	  permeable	  sovereignty,	  then	  why	  not	  opt	  for	  clear	  (al-­‐beit	  imperfect)	  rules,	  laid	  down	  authoritatively	  by	  the	  Court,	  over	  judicial	  balancing,	  with	  all	  the	  “[h]ard[	  ]	  cases”	  that	  will	  require	  resolution	  under	  that	  uncertain	  stand-­‐ard?86	  Conversely,	  Greene	  argues	  that	  one	  could	  accept	  the	  principle	  of	  permeable	  
                                                            	   80.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	   supra	   note	  1,	   at	  20,	  22,	  121,	  126.	  On	   the	   latter	  point,	   see	  HORWITZ,	  FIRST	  AMENDMENT	   INSTITUTIONS,	   supra	  note	  5,	   at	  16,	  72-­‐74	   (arguing	   that	   law	  should	  be	  understood	   in	  a	  bottom-­‐up	   fashion	   in	  which	  a	  variety	  of	  spheres	  and	   institutions	  participate,	  along	  with	   lawmakers,	   in	  building	  legal	  rules	  and	  norms).	  
 81.  Abner S. Greene, What is Constitutional Obligation?, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1239, 1249 (2013).  	   82.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  5,	  33.	  
 83.  See Wexler, supra note 62. 	   84.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  116,	  149.	  	   85.	  	   Id.	  at	  149.	  
 86.  Id.	  at	  158.	  The indeterminacy of that test is nicely captured by Greene in one description (one that I 
agree with in broad terms, incidentally): “[W]e can seek a nuanced approach to relaxing the demands of the 
state, to allowing religious and philosophical and other sources of normative authority to govern the lives of the 
state’s subjects to the fullest extent compatible with the stable operation of government and the liberty of other 
10
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sovereignty	  while	  rejecting	  his	  approach	  to	  the	  Religion	  Clauses.87	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  then	   again	  we	  must	   ask	  where	   and	  how	   strong	   the	   linkage	   is	   between	  his	   theory	  and	  his	  recommended	  practice.	  In	  some	  places,	  the	  linkage	  seems	  especially	  weak.	  Recall,	  for	  example,	  that	  in	  order	   to	   avoid	   the	   concerns	   about	   endless	   exemptions	   that	   produced	   the	   rule	   in	  
Smith,	  Greene	  suggests	  that	  courts	  could	  ask	  whether	  particular	  religious	  burdens	  are	  “obligatory	  or	  central”	  to	  those	  claimants’	  faiths.88	  Greene	  anticipates	  the	  objec-­‐tion	   that	   questions	   such	   as	   centrality	   will	   entangle	   courts	   in	   religious	   questions	  they	  ought	  not	  decide.	  His	  answer	  to	  this	  concern	  is	  that	  “if	  parties	  don’t	  want	  such	  judicial	   questioning,	   then	   they	   don’t	   have	   to	   ask	   for	   an	   exemption.	   Waiver	   here	  seems	  a	  sensible	  posture.”89	  His	  answer	  may	  be	  sensible.	  But	   it’s	  hard	   to	  see	  how	  such	  an	  answer,	  which	  treats	  fundamental	  religious	  claims	  and	  questions	  as	  easily	  defeasible,	  follows	  from	  or	  is	  even	  consistent	  with	  permeable	  sovereignty.90	  In	  short,	  Greene	  may	  make	  an	  attractive	  case	  for	  permeable	  sovereignty,	  and	  he	  may	  make	  an	  attractive	  case	  for	  his	  particular	  vision	  of	  religious	  liberty.	  But	  I	  am	  not	  convinced	  that	  he	  makes	  as	  strong	  a	  case	  for	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  two.	  As	  I	  noted	  earlier,	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  common	  problem	  in	  law	  and	  religion	  scholarship,	  which	  is	  often	  most	  vulnerable	  at	  the	  point	  where	  theory	  becomes	  practice.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  problem	  for	  Greene	  as	  well.	  
B.	   Questions	  of	  Implementation	  Every	  theory	  of	  religious	  liberty	  is	  bound	  to	  face	  difficult	  questions	  of	  imple-­‐mentation,	  at	  least	  if	  its	  author	  is	  forthright	  enough	  to	  attempt	  to	  provide	  practical	  guidance.91	  Greene	  does	  an	  admirable	  job	  of	  detailing	  the	  practice	  of	  religious	  liber-­‐ty	  under	  his	  approach.	  But	  his	  discussion	  raises	  many	  questions.	   I	  approach	  them	  primarily	   first	   through	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   balancing	   test	   Greene	   proposes,	   and	  then	  add	  some	  questions	  on	  top	  of	  that,	  roughly	  following	  the	  order	  of	  his	  chapter.	  I	  
ask	  these	  questions;	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  I	  do	  not	  answer	  them.	  Begin	  with	  one	  of	  the	  threshold	  requirements	  of	  Greene’s	  exemption-­‐friendly	  balancing	  approach.	  Under	  that	  approach,	  “the	  citizen	  should	  first	  make	  her	  case	  for	  how	  she	   is	  burdened.	  .	  .	  .	  This	  makes	   sense	  because	  we	  want	   to	   screen	  out	   citizen	  claims	  based	  on	  either	  insubstantial	  hits	  to	  serious	  interests	  or	  any	  kind	  of	  hit	  to	  an	  
                                                                                                                                                    
persons.” Id. at 115. A world of uncertainty occupies the last seventeen words of that sentence. 	   87.	  	   Id.	  at	  149.	  	   88.	  	   Id.	  at	  131.	  	   89.	  	   Id.	  at	  132.	  
 90.  Nor, for that matter, am I entirely convinced that his entire “political balance” argument, which as far as 
I know predated his writings on permeable sovereignty, has much to do with permeable sovereignty in the final 
analysis. I relegate this point to a footnote for two reasons. First, I may be biased here: I share his interest in 
permeable sovereignty but have always resisted his argument for an Establishment Clause gag rule. Second, 
there is at least a plausible connection in the book between his account of permeable sovereignty and his gag 
rule argument. But the connection still seems fragile to me. It is true that Free Exercise exemptions might 
“ameliorate the legitimacy/obligation problem caused by the gag rule.” Id. at 157. But I am not convinced that 
the gag rule itself is a necessary consequence of permeable sovereignty.  
 91.  Some writers attempt to avoid these problems by focusing on doctrine while bracketing or ignoring 
questions of theory. The attempt fails. Church-state doctrinalism without any theory either begs all the ques-
tions of theory it seeks to avoid, or accepts as a given whatever theory can be said to animate the jurisprudence. 
In either case, it cannot escape questions of theory, and the failure to engage those questions leaves it without 
any resources to answer them.  
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interest	  not	  part	  of	  one’s	  deeper	  set	  of	  values.”92	  Again,	  this	  sounds	  sensible	  enough.	  But	  how	  do	  we	  distinguish	  between	  substantial	  and	  insubstantial	  “hits?”	  As	  I	  noted	  earlier,93	   this	   distinction	   appears	   to	   be	   intended	   to	   ward	   off	   the	   concerns	   about	  endless	   exemptions	   that	   ended	   up	   ushering	   in	  Smith.94	   But	  Smith	  happened	   for	   a	  reason.	  Drawing	  these	  sorts	  of	  distinctions	  is	  indeed	  difficult.	  Consider	   another	   key	   aspect	   of	   Greene’s	   test:	   “Government	   has	   to	   earn	   its	  stripes,	  law	  by	  law	  or	  case	  by	  case.”95	  This	  appears	  to	  relate	  to	  both	  his	  underlying	  argument	   for	   permeable	   sovereignty,	   and	   his	   desire	   to	   ensure	   that	   government	  does	  not	  simply	  win	  every	  case	  by	  claiming	  an	  interest	  in	  uniform	  application	  of	  the	  law.96	  But	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  government	  must	  prove	  itself	  “law	  by	  law	  or	   case	   by	   case?”	   Won’t	   government	   (and	   courts)	   learn	   from	   experience?	   As	   it	  learns,	  won’t	   case-­‐by-­‐case	  balancing	   end	  up	  ushering	   in	  more	   categorical	   rules?97	  And	  given	  the	  cost-­‐sharing	  and	  risk-­‐spreading	  nature	  of	  many	  modern	  social	  wel-­‐fare	  regimes,	  is	  Greene	  right	  to	  say	  that	  “a	  mere	  desire	  for	  uniformity	  [should]	  (al-­‐most)	  never	  suffice	  as	  a	  compelling	  state	  interest”?98	  	  More	   generally,	   Greene	   argues	   that	   “we	   should	   not	   be	   troubled	   by	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   judicial	   balancing”	   because	   it	   is	   “a	   familiar	   task”	   for	   common-­‐law-­‐oriented	  constitutional	   courts,	   and	   he	   cites	   as	   an	   example	   the	   free	   speech	   cases	   involving	  time,	  place,	  and	  manner.99	  This	  seems	  too	  sunny	  a	  view.	  It	  is	  not	  as	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  courts	   actually	   do	   time,	   place,	   and	  manner	   tests	  well,	   or	   that	   they	   do	   not	   end	   up	  substantially	   favoring	   the	   state	   or	   the	   majority.100	   Similarly,	   he	   praises	   Martha	  
                                                            	   92.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  118-­‐19.	  
 93.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 94.  Another reason to doubt this will succeed is that even if courts stem the flood by evaluating substantiali-
ty and centrality up front, we are still left with the ruling in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), 
which treats highly idiosyncratic individual religious claimants’ as sincere, and thus allows a proliferation of 
valid claims of centrality and substantiality based on individual religious views. Shoring up the dike at one 
point will not prevent it from collapsing at others. 	   95.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  124.	  
 96.  Id.	  at	  118. It also relates to a standard question in the case law: whether the compelling interest test 
should be applied only with narrow reference to the specific case before the court, or whether it should weigh 
in the balance all the possible exemptions to the challenged law that might arise. Compare Gonzalez v. O Cen-
tra Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-32 (2006) (holding that RFRA requires a “focused in-
quiry” in which government must show that its compelling interest requires “application of the challenged law 
‘to . . .’ the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened”), with United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982) (rejecting an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause because “it 
would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing 
from a wide variety of religious beliefs.”).  
 97.  See generally Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803 (2005). 
 98.  GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at	  118. For example, Greene questions the result in Unit-
ed States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), which refused to grant an exemption to the Social Security tax payment 
system for an Amish employer of Amish workers, arguing that it presented “less than compelling state inter-
ests.” GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 123. But a court informed by experience, and by 
knowledge of the Social Security system, might well have concluded that some benefits regimes—an increas-
ing number of them, in fact—depend on uniformity to work. How broadly Lee applies will likely be a major 
issue in the Supreme Court’s treatment of the contraceptive mandate cases, which it is about to hear as of the 
time of this writing.  	   99.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  131-­‐32.	  
 100.  For a mixed review, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783 (2007). See also Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Ju-
dicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 604-05 (1993) (arguing that time, place, and manner doctrine ends up 
favoring majoritarian preferences).  
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Nussbaum	   for	   seeking	   to	   guard	   against	   “the	   slippery	   nature	   of	   public	   order	   and	  safety	  claims”	  made	  by	  the	  state	  by	  emphasizing	  that	  “‘the	  threat	  to	  stability	  [posed	  by	  a	  religious	  liberty]	  must	  be	  extremely	  evident,	   in	  terms	  of	  a	  manifest	  breach	  of	  
civil	  peace,	  if	  there	  is	  to	  be	  any	  legitimacy	  to	  state	  infringement.’”101	  That	  sounds	  a	  lot	  like	  the	  free	  speech	  cases	  dealing	  with	  incitement	  of	  lawless	  activity.	  Those	  cases	  erect	  a	  strong	  bulwark	  against	  prosecution.102	  But	  they	  are	  not	  wholly	  indicative	  of	  the	  main	  body	  of	  free	  speech	  law,	  which	  is	  full	  of	  categorical	  distinctions,	  regularly	  accused	  of	  incoherence,	  and	  in	  some	  areas	  has	  ended	  up	  by	  ushering	  in	  a	  Smith-­‐like	  approach	  that	  favors	  rules	  of	  general	  applicability.103	  In	  short,	  the	  “stepped-­‐up	  judicial	  scrutiny”	  Greene	  recommends	  raises	  a	  lot	  of	  practical	  questions.104	  If	  this	  approach,	  whatever	  its	  problems,	  is	  compelled	  by	  the	  argument	   from	   permeable	   sovereignty,	   then	   so	   be	   it;	   but,	   as	   I	   have	   said,	   it’s	   not	  clear	  how	  strong	  the	  linkage	  between	  the	  two	  is.	  In	  any	  event,	  but	  especially	  if	  it	  is	  treated	   independently	   of	   permeable	   sovereignty,	   Greene’s	   approach	   leaves	   open	  questions	  about	  how	  it	  will	  be	  implemented	  and	  whether	  that	  implementation	  will	  succeed.105	   Indeed,	   it	   is	  precisely	   these	  questions	  of	   implementation	  that	  arguably	  led	  us	  to	  Smith.	  I	  have	  similar	  questions	  about	  Greene’s	  advocacy	  of	  a	  political	  balancing	  ap-­‐proach	  to	  the	  Religion	  Clauses,	  and	  specifically	  his	  argument	   for	  an	  Establishment	  Clause	  gag	  rule.	  Space	  limitations	  prevent	  me	  from	  going	  into	  them	  in	  great	  detail,	  and	  in	  any	  event	  they	  have	  been	  raised	  elsewhere.106	  I	  agree	  with	  those	  critics	  who	  argue	   that	   expressly	   religious	   arguments	   are	   neither	   as	   inaccessible	   to	   others	   as	  Greene	  claims,	  nor	  are	  they	  any	  more	  inaccessible	  than	  other	  arguments,	  even	  os-­‐tensibly	   “secular”	   ones.107	   That	   seems	   especially	   true	   to	  me	   in	   the	   current	   age,	   a	  “secular	  age”108	  or	  “agnostic	  age”109	   in	  which	  many	  people	   live	  cheek	  by	   jowl	  with	  others	  who	  hold	  different	   religious	  beliefs	   or	  non-­‐beliefs,	   and	   in	  which	  both	  non-­‐belief	  and	  many	  forms	  of	  religious	  belief	  are	  at	  least	  imaginable	  to	  many	  of	  us.110	  I	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would	  just	  add	  a	  few	  other	  points.	  First	  and	  most	   important,	   I	   think	  Greene	   is	  mistaken	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   the	  best	  reading	  of	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  deliberative	  process	  of	  lawmak-­‐ing	  rather	  than	  the	  result—on	  the	  inputs	  rather	  than	  the	  outputs	  of	   lawmaking.111	  The	  Establishment	  Clause,	  on	  this	  view,	  bars	  certain	  legislative	  outcomes	  that	  effec-­‐tively	  require	  the	  state	  to	  announce	  conclusions	  on	  questions	  of	  religious	  truth.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  bar	  legislative	  outcomes	  that	  merely	  depend	  on	  lawmakers’	  views	  of	  re-­‐ligious	   truth,	   no	   matter	   how	   explicitly	   they	   relied	   on	   those	   views.	   I	   agree	   with	  Greene	   in	   favoring	   an	   exemption	   regime	  under	   the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause,	   but	   I	   do	  not	  share	  his	  Establishment	  Clause-­‐based	  reasons	  for	  favoring	  such	  a	  regime.	  	  Second,	  I	  doubt	  the	  problem	  is	  great	  enough	  to	  warrant	  such	  a	  gag	  rule.	  Given	  both	   the	   state	  of	  American	   religious	  pluralism	  and	   the	  background	   legal	   rule	   that	  accommodations	   and	   other	   laws	   cannot	   improperly	   favor	   particular	   denomina-­‐tions,112	   there	   are	   plenty	   of	   reasons	   (apart	   from	   their	   own	   inclinations	   to	   do	   so,	  which	  will	  generally	  suffice)	  for	  lawmakers	  to	  voluntarily	  offer	  a	  suite	  of	  both	  reli-­‐gious	  and	  non-­‐religious	  arguments	  for	  laws.	  Third,	  on	  a	  related	  point,	  Greene’s	  ar-­‐gument	  for	  a	  gag	  rule	  is,	  he	  says,	  “nation-­‐	  and	  practice-­‐specific.”113	  And	  our	  culture	  is	  religiously	  and	  politically	  pluralistic.	  For	  that	  and	  other	  reasons,	  most	  lawmakers	  rely	  on	  a	  mixture	  of	  religious	  and	  non-­‐religious	  reasons	  in	  support	  of	  the	  laws	  they	  seek	  to	  pass.	  Given	  those	  factors,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  our	  experience	  justifies	  Greene’s	  gag	  rule,	  at	  least	  as	  long	  as	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  is	  treated	  as	  maintaining	  a	  limita-­‐tion	  on	  particular	  legislative	  outputs.	  	  Finally,	   Greene	   argues	   that	   his	   rule	   is	   acceptable	   because,	   while	   some	   laws	  will	   pass	   and	  others	  won’t,	   his	   approach	   “will	   eliminate	   the	  Establishment	  Clause	  injury	  of	  excluding	  nonbelievers	  from	  meaningful	  participation	  in	  the	  political	  pro-­‐cess.”114	  Maybe	  so.	  But	  it	  may	  result	  in	  the	  opposite	  problem:	  the	  injury	  of	  excluding	  some	   believers	   from	   meaningful	   participation	   in	   the	   political	   process.	   Moreover,	  that	  burden	  will	  fall	  unequally.	  Most	  mainstream	  believers	  already	  make	  both	  “sec-­‐ular”	  and	  “religious”	  arguments	  in	  public	  debate	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  course.	  The	  citizens	  most	  greatly	  affected	  by	  Greene’s	  gag	  rule	  will	  be	  those	  with	  comprehensive,	  fierce-­‐ly	  held	  religious	  beliefs.	  That	  should	  concern	  anyone,	  like	  Greene,	  who	  is	  convinced	  of	  the	  value	  of	  plu-­‐ralism	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  multiple	  sovereigns,	  but	  still	  hopes	  for	  some	  level	  of	  coexistence	  in	  our	  social	  order.	  Greene	  already	  acknowledges	  the	  strain	  that	  illiber-­‐al	  groups	  put	  on	  his	  or	  any	  other	  legal	  and	  social	  regime.115	  He	  might	  consider	  the	  risk	  that	  an	  up-­‐front	  gag	  rule	  will	  drive	  more	  individuals	  and	  groups	  into	  the	  arms	  of	   illiberalism,	   and	   an	   outright	   rejection	   of	   peaceful	   coexistence.116	  As	   long	   as	  we	  
                                                                                                                                                    
154. 
 111.  See, e.g., HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 10, at 258-62, 270. Andrew Koppelman takes a 
similar view. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 10, at 94; Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 
89 (2002). 
 112.  See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 	   113.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  155.	  	   114.	  	   Id.	  at	  152.	  	   115.	  	   Id.	  at	  157.	  
 116.  See LUCAS SWAINE, THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE: POLITICS AND PRINCIPLE IN A WORLD OF RELIGIOUS 
PLURALISM (2008); see also HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 10, at 205-08. 
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss2/2
2013]	   PERMEABLE	  SOVEREIGNTY	  AND	  RELIGIOUS	  LIBERTY	   249	  
have	  certain	  Establishment	  Clause	  limitations	  on	  legislative	  outputs,	   it	   is	  better,	   in	  my	  view,	  to	  keep	  such	  individuals	  as	  part	  of	  the	  conversation,	  however	  difficult	  that	  conversation	  may	  be,	  than	  to	  risk	  driving	  them	  further	  away.	  CONCLUSION:	  A	  QUESTION	  ABOUT	  “LAW”	  The	   questions	   I	   have	   asked	   so	   far	   are	   critical	   and	   skeptical.	   They	   are	   not,	   I	  noted,	  unique	   to	  Greene’s	  approach;	   they	  can	  be	  asked	  of	   just	  about	  any	   legal	   im-­‐plementation	  of	  a	   theory	  of	   religious	   liberty.	  But	   they	  are	   important	   in	  evaluating	  Greene’s	  work	  too.	  That	   these	  questions	  remain	   is	  hardly	  a	   fatal	  criticism.	  Against	  
Obligation	  is	  an	  important,	  provocative,	  and	  timely	  book.	  Let	  me	  close	  with	  a	  question	  that	  is	  unlikely	  to	  occur	  to	  most	  of	  Greene’s	  crit-­‐ics,	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  skeptical	  about	  permeable	  sovereignty	  and	  loyal	  to	  the	  lib-­‐eral	  state.	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  Greene	  does	  not,	  in	  one	  respect,	  cede	  too	  much	  ground	  to	  his	  critics	  and	  their	  worldview.	  Greene’s	   permeable	   sovereignty	   approach,	   we	   have	   seen,	   treats	   “all	   of	   our	  sources	  of	  value,	  of	  how	  to	  live,	  as	  at	  least	  presumptively	  on	  par	  with	  each	  other,	  as	  equal.”117	   “The	   state’s	   law,”	   on	   this	   view,	   “should	  .	  .	  .	   be	   understood	   as	   just	   one	  source	  of	   the	  norms	   that	  properly	  govern	  people’s	   lives.”118	  Despite	   this,	  Greene’s	  language	  ends	  up	  stacking	  the	  deck	   in	   favor	  of	   the	  state,	  or	  at	   least	  of	  a	  particular	  view	  of	  law,	  by	  treating	  other	  nomic	  communities	  and	  sources	  of	  norms	  as	  not	  be-­‐ing	  part	  of	   “the	   law.”	  Thus,	  he	  speaks	   in	   terms	  of	   judicial	  exemptions	   for	  religious	  claimants	  as	  “releasing	  [them]	  from	  the	  grip	  of	  the	  law,”	  frames	  the	  case	  for	  exemp-­‐tions	  as	  an	  “exit”	  remedy,	  and	  talks	  about	  exemptions	  as	  “providing	  a	  balm	  against	  the	  otherwise	  scorching	  demands	  of	  the	  law.”119	  All	   this	   is	   understandable	   enough,	   and	   perhaps	   not	   too	  much	   hangs	   on	   the	  language	  here.	  But	   I	  wonder	  whether	   it	  does	  not	  give	  away	   too	  much	  ground.	  Ar-­‐guments	  for	  permeable	  sovereignty,	  or	  institutional	  autonomy,	  or	  the	  importance	  of	  nomic	   authority,	   or	   simply	   for	   accommodation	   of	   individual	   claimants	   under	   the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause,	  are	  not	  just	  arguments	  for	  “exceptions”	  from	  “the	  law.”	  They	  are,	   in	   large	  measure,	   arguments	   about	   what	   “the	   law”	   itself	   requires,	   and	   about	  what	  it	  encompasses.	  As	   I	   have	   written	   elsewhere,	   “In	   thinking	   about	   ‘what	   the	   law	   is,’	   we	   need	  not—and	   perhaps	   ought	   not—think	   solely	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   positive	   law	   of	   the	  state.”120	  Religious	  and	  other	  nomic	  communities	  are	  indeed	  independent	  sources	  of	  authority.	  But	   they	  are	  also	  a	  part	  of	   “[o]ur	  constitutional	  order,”	  which	  embraces	  “multiple	   repositories	   of	   power.”121	   When	   we	   defer	   to	   agency	   interpretations	   of	  statutes,122	  we	  do	  not	  speak	  in	  terms	  of	  those	  agencies	  being	  “outside	  the	  law.”	  Ra-­‐ther,	  we	  treat	  them	  as	  part	  of	  the	  law,	  as	  partners	  in	  developing	  its	  unfolding	  mean-­‐ing.	   I	  worry	   that	   treating	   Free	   Exercise	   exemptions	   as	   an	   “exit”	   or	   “escape”	   from	  
                                                            	   117.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  2	  (emphasis	  added).	  	   118.	  	   Id.	  at	  4.	  	   119.	  	   Id.	  at	  10,	  115,	  149.	  
 120.  Horwitz, Rethinking the Law, supra note 5, at 363 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 
(1803)). 	   121.	  	   GREENE,	  AGAINST	  OBLIGATION,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  3.	  
 122.  See Chevron U.A.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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“the	  law”	  constitutes	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  surrender	  of	  rhetorical	  ground	  to	  those	  who	  in-­‐sist	  that	  legal	  uniformity	  itself	  is	  a	  clear,	  powerful,	  and	  sufficient	  value.	  Rather,	  we	  might	  think	  and	  speak	  of	  permeable	  sovereignty	  as	  involving	  an	  insistence	  that	  reli-­‐gious	  and	  other	  nomic	  communities,	  with	  the	  substantial	  authority	  they	  enjoy	  with-­‐in	   their	   proper	   sphere,	   form	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   our	   social	   order—of	   our	   “law,”	  properly	  understood	   and	   interpreted.	  Through	   the	  Religion	  Clauses,	   that	   includes	  our	  positive	  law.	  They	  are	  inside	  the	  law	  as	  well	  as	  outside	  it.	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